radical orientation of Mao Zedong's foreign policy as China plunged into its Cultural Revolution convinced President Lyndon Johnson that it would be unwise to abandon the long-standing U.S. approach. Nonetheless, as Lumbers shows, one of the ironies of the Vietnam War is that it did help spur a few important modiªcations of U.S. dealings with the PRC. Because the Johnson administration wanted to prevent China from intervening in the war and to bolster public support within the United States, the administration eased travel restrictions with the Chinese mainland, encouraged unofªcial contacts, and toned down its rhetoric. These steps, modest though they were, adumbrated the much more far-reaching changes adopted by the Nixon administration ªve years later.
The third and fourth articles in this issue are review essays. The essay by Richard Drake complements his article in the previous issue of the journal. The four books surveyed in the two essays include translations of declassiªed documents from the former Soviet archives and commentaries based on those documents. The two books discussed in Drake's latest essay underscore the heavy dependence of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on the Soviet Union for ªnancial and material support. Over the decades, Soviet leaders provided more funding to the PCI than to any other Communist party in a non-Communist state. Not until the early 1980s did the Italian Communists ªnally curb their reliance on Moscow's largesse. Until that time, the inºux of money from the Soviet Union not only skewed the PCI's objectives and corrupted its leaders, but also created a legacy that the Left Democrats, the main successor party to the PCI, have yet to overcome.
The other review essay, by Richard T. Davies, considers several issues examined in a recent book by Douglas J. MacEachin, the former deputy director for intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the crisis in Poland in 1980-1981, MacEachin was the most senior CIA ofªcial handling the crisis on a day-to-day basis. His book provides a sympathetic, but by no means uncritical, assessment of the agency's performance. One of the central issues raised by the book is whether the CIA went far enough in using the invaluable information it received from Colonel Ryszard Kukliñski, a senior ofªcer on the Polish General Staff who was secretly working for the CIA. Davies agrees with MacEachin that it is difªcult to answer this question, but both of them believe that the Reagan administration was remiss in not having tried to do more to prevent the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981.
The main articles are followed by twenty-six shorter book reviews. It is always a pleasure to end on a note of congratulations-in this case for a friend and colleague, William Taubman, who has long been a professor of political science at Amherst College and an associate of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. After more than twenty years of assiduous research and writing, Bill completed his long-awaited biography of Nikita Khrushchev two years ago. The book-Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002)-was well worth the wait. Not only has it been greeted with laudatory reviews (including a review that will appear in the next issue of the JCWS), but it also has earned distinguished prizes. In February 2004, Bill received the National Book Critics Circle Award, and two months later he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for biographical studies. These awards are richly deserved.
